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The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 changed
forever the way America views its everyday safety, as well
as the safety of how we travel.  The United States
government took swift and dramatic action to change civil
aviation security with the passing of the Aviation
Transportation and Security Act (ATSA) of 2001.  In the
months following the attacks, politicians and the media
made their viewpoints known while civil aviation security
professionals have been unheard.
The objective of this thesis is to ascertain the best
practices and recommendations of these stakeholders to
provide the highest level of security at our nations
airports.  To gather these data, the researcher conducted
on-site interviews of these professionals. 
The study reveals civil aviation was not adequately
prepared for the terrorist attacks of September 11. 
Congressional mandates of the ATSA have driven government’s
behavior. The lack of aviation experience of senior
leadership and its top-down approach has alienated
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The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 changed
forever the way America views its everyday safety, as well
as the safety of how we travel.  The United States
government took swift and dramatic action to change civil
aviation security with the passing of the Aviation
Transportation and Security Act of 2001.  While the
politicians and media quickly made their viewpoints known,
civil aviation security systems professionals have gone
largely unheard.  
The objective of this thesis is to ascertain the best
practices and recommendations of these unheard experts to
provide the highest level of passenger and employee
security at our nation's airports.  To gather these data,
the researcher conducted on-site interviews with aviation
security stakeholders, all of whom are recognized leaders
in their fields of expertise.  
A. THE PROBLEM
How can America prevent future terrorist attacks
against the United States? The Aviation Transportation And
Security Act imposes stringent security measures and
created a new federal regulatory agency, the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA).  The TSA has imposed its
regulations without regard to their effects on the
economics or the daily operations of its constituency and
the flying public.  This agency started with no employees
and is scheduled to hire an estimated 60,000 or more
personnel.  Senior leadership of the TSA is weighted
heavily with law enforcement personnel who have little or
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no aviation experience.  The TSA has ignored the views of
aviation experts, resulting in a top-down, heavy-handed
approach that has drawn heavy criticism. 
B.  THE SOLUTION
Teamwork between federal government and aviation
stakeholders is paramount.  First, they must address the
human factor: properly compensated, qualified and trained
security personnel will best prevent future attacks.  Next,
identify potential threats before check-in by using
technology such as passenger profiling and a "trusted
traveler" program.  Finally, a layered security approach,
which does not to rely too much on any one system, will
yield the best results.    
C.  CONSEQUENCES
If the federal government cannot work with aviation
stakeholders to find the best ways to improve airport
security procedures and protocols, then the result is
likely to be hastily implemented and costly—yet potentially
ineffective—solutions.  In the rush to meet federal
mandates, high-quality results are being set aside and




The methodology used in this research consisted of an
extensive literature search and review of newspapers,
magazines, professional journals and Internet articles. In
addition, a semi-structured survey containing open-ended
questions (Appendix A) was developed and used to seek
opinions from aviation security professionals. These
interviews were conducted either in person or by phone.  Of
the eight confidential interviews, six were conducted in
person, two by phone.  Two additional surveys were
conducted by phone to gain additional insights and round
out the variety of interview participants. The thesis
discusses the seven main themes distilled from these
interviews.
Much of the research focused on the development of the
newly created Transportation Security Administration (TSA),
a federal agency under the auspices of Department of
Transportation (DOT).  The study examines incidents and
political circumstances that led to the TSA's replacement
of its predecessor, the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA), in the field of aviation security.  Included in this
discussion are events in aviation security since September
11, 2001 and their impact on government action and public
perception. 
The research also includes a recent history of
aviation security systems in Europe and Israel and their
potential influence on America's aviation security systems.
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The majority of the research for this paper was
completed by 31 May 2002. Any major regulatory decisions
made by the Department of Transportation, the
Transportation Security Administration, American airports
and airline players and stakeholders after 31 May 2002 are
not included and their effects not considered.
B. LITERATURE REVIEW
Literature dealing with aviation security systems
before and after September 11 events is abundant.  Internet
web pages and articles, as well as articles in newspapers,
magazines, and professional journals, were cross-checked to
ensure accuracy of quotes and facts.  Because the changes
in aviation security since September 11, 2001 are so
recent, no books addressing the focus of this thesis were
available. 
C. QUESTIONNAIRE
A semi-structured questionnaire (Appendix A) was used
to tap stakeholders’ knowledge and opinions concerning the
path America should take towards improving civil aviation
security for employees and passengers.  
The questionnaire addressed stakeholders' views on
several fronts: what emphasis did America place on aviation
security before 9/11? What did they think about
federalizing the passenger and baggage screening functions?
What was their opinion of the way aviation security is
performed in Europe and Israel? Should security be
localized or centralized? What is the impact of the TSA’s
guidelines? What is the effect of profiling? And, finally,
what kind of aviation security system would work best for
America?
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1. Interview Questionnaire Development 
The questionnaire was developed, in part, as a
response to the recommendations for improved security that
politicians and media personalities started to make
immediately after the tragic events of September 11.
Congress rushed to nationalize baggage and passenger
screening of airport security.  The media and politicians
rushed to judge the system as faulty and in need of
immediate, radical correction.  However, there was a real
lack of direction coming from the major stakeholders
themselves: airport operators, airlines, and the Federal
Aviation Administration.  The approach of this thesis is to
get the thoughts and opinions of stakeholders who are close
to the industry and/or work in the daily operations of
aviation security and to ask them how to implement best
practices and procedures. 
D. INTERVIEWS
The researcher drafted the original set of questions
from his perspective of an outsider to the industry.  After
the first interview, it was apparent that the list would
have to be tailored to elicit responses that would be
applicable to the goals of the research. After attending
the Second Annual Aviation Security Summit (26-27 March
2002) in San Francisco, the researcher further modified the
questionnaire to get the desired information.
Interviews were conducted in person unless time or
distance would not permit.  All but two of the interviews





The researcher interviewed four types of respondents:
airport security operators, industry trade representatives
for airports and air carriers, airport security
consultants, and employees of federal government agencies
that either directly support or inspect airport/air carrier
security procedures.  The purpose was to develop both an
operating- and a policy-level perspective.
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III.BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
On September 11, 2001, the terrorist group al Qaeda
hijacked four U.S. airliners.  What made these hijackings
unique was their purpose: to use a fully fueled airplane as
a missile to direct an attack on the United States.  The
terrorist plan was well thought out, well planned, and well
executed (Teebay, 2002).  It played on the weaknesses of
our aviation security systems.  
The hijackers studied our security system, looking for
weaknesses and vulnerabilities, and they took advantage of
Americans' traditional views of a hijacking.  We had been
trained to stay calm, take a passive role, and let the
authorities take charge.   Rarely have we seen fatalities
in these previous scenarios.  Prior to the actual
hijacking, the terrorists did not break any Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations regarding luggage
or carry-on items (Teebay, 2002). 
The September 11 terrorist against the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon changed America’s attitude about
its invulnerability to foreign threats.   It changed our
entire way of thinking about our own security.  Air travel,
until this time, seemed easy, convenient (in terms of
security and baggage delays) and carefree.  Terrorism was
something that happened somewhere else.  Our sympathy went
out to all those victims and governments who had to battle
it overseas.
Civil aviation security experts believe what broke
down was our intelligence (Lewandowski and Arena, 2002). 
At least two of the hijackers had been in America for
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months (Reuters, 2002), learning our system to use it
against us (Teebay, 2002).
In November 2001, Congress passed the Transportation
and Security Act (ATSA)(PL-107-71) nationalizing baggage
and passenger screening functions of airport security. 
This act created the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA), which has been given the task of assuming the
federal security functions of the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA).  Original manpower estimates of
18,000 personnel have climbed threefold to an estimated
60,000 personnel.  The government’s goal is to hire them by
the end of 2002. A new federal agency of this size has not
been started since World War II (TSA, 2002).
The terrorists exposed our reliance on air carriers to
provide adequate passenger and baggage screening
protection. Now, the question is not only how fast can we
provide adequate security, but how?  At what cost: who can
provide the best security with the least cost?  Can this
come from the private sector, or is this an issue that only
the federal government can handle?  How can we implement
changes to our system without chasing away passengers with
inconvenient and intrusive methods? And how can we
implement changes without driving air carriers and airports
to financial ruin?
A. HISTORY OF THE FAA
Previous to September 11, the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) had purview over aviation security. 
Congress initiated the FAA with the Air Commerce Act of May
20, 1926.  Its purpose was to promote air commerce, issue
and enforce air traffic rules, establish airways, and
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operate and maintain aids to navigation (FAA 2002a).  When
the FAA was created under the auspices of the Department of
Commerce, security was not mentioned as a focus.
As aviation grew and saw the introduction and
evolution of jet airliners, a series of midair collisions
spurred the passage of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. 
With its passage, the Federal Aviation Agency was created. 
Its new duties included a consolidation of previously
shared duties relating to air navigation and traffic
control (FAA 2002b).
In 1966, aviation transportation was combined with
other methods of transportation under a cabinet-level
Department of Transportation.  The FAA changed from an
Agency to an Administration.
1. The Development of Anti-Hijacking Regulations
Several notable hijackings in the 1960s caused the FAA
to focus on the security aspect of civil aviation (FAA
2002b).  The Anti-Hijacking Act of 1974 addressed actions
to stop hijacking attempts.  Among the provisions addressed
were: international support for terrorism; sanctions
against foreign countries not providing a minimum level of
security for air carrier contents; passenger searches; and
passenger and baggage screening procedures. This Act laid
out the protocol for dealing with hijackings—until
September 11, 2001.
Discussions were held when the 1974 Act was passed
regarding limitations of personal carry-on items; personal
knives with blade lengths up to four-and-one-half inches
were allowed onboard commercial airlines.  The thinking at
that time was that no one could hijack a plane with these
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knives, and, therefore, that they did not constitute a
threat. The weapons used by the September 11 hijackers were
completely within FAA guidelines (Teebay, 2002).  
B. THE ROLE OF AIR CARRIERS IN AVIATION SECURITY PRIOR TO
SEPTEMBER 11
With the current scrutiny of airport security, it is
important to clarify the responsibilities of air carriers
versus those of the airport itself.  
Air carriers do not perform their own screening, but
instead contract out to private security firms.  There are
almost 100 security screening companies employing almost
18,000 screeners at U.S. commercial airports (GAO 2000b).
Some of the larger airports actually use several companies
at various checkpoints.
A common misconception perpetuated by the media in the
aftermath of September 11 is that airports employ “airport
screeners”; their correct title is airline screener.
Airport security entails security functions involving all
other aspects of protecting the airport: employee,
contractor and vendor access points. 
Because of the relative safety from hijacking that
America has enjoyed, as well as air carriers’ ever-present
emphasis on minimizing customer inconvenience, the air
carriers viewed the screening function as a cost center
instead of a major security concern. With this in mind, any
savings achieved in screening would add to the profit
margins of virtually all U.S. air carriers.   According to
the Air Transport Association (Swierenga 2002), Table 1
below demonstrates this fact:
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A cause of low-quality screeners is the industry’s
thin profit margins and the resulting minimum wage for
screeners.  As one anonymous airport advocate stated: “This
was fundamental to the economic philosophy of the air
carrier which is you want to pay the minimum.”  Airlines
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are “for profit” organizations and must answer to the
shareholder for their financial performance.  
In 2001, the industry lost over seven billion dollars
(Hallett 2002).  Airlines were experiencing a downturn, and
the events of September 11 accelerated the losses. That
figure includes the four billion dollars the industry
received as part of the emergency federal cash compensation
from the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization
Act.  In other words, without the subsidy, the industry
would have lost $11 billion dollars. This industry is
traditionally debt-heavy, and the airlines must have cash
to operate because they are constantly paying on debt
service and have numerous fixed costs.  
C.  THE RECENT HISTORY OF AIRPORT SECURITY PRIOR TO
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
Problems have been identified in recent years by such
entities as the Congress, the General Accounting Office and
the Gore Commission to alert the public to the continual
problems with our aviation security systems.  This section
looks at various milestones, responsibilities, challenges
and problems prior to the events of September 11.  While
there are additional findings, those presented here
exemplify the known reported concerns. 
Airport screening began with the FAA anti-hijacking
emergency rule of December 1972, which required U.S. air
carriers to scan all passengers and to inspect all carry-on
baggage for weapons and dangerous objects (FAA 2002b). 
This was in response to several U.S. hijackings in the
1960s.
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In investigating the causes of the events of September
11, the Gore Commission made many recommendations. Two GAO
reports identified serious concerns regarding screeners’
performance and security breeches at airports.
1. The Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996
Congress recognized the continuing threat of terrorist
attacks against Americans via bombing, kidnapping and
destruction of civilian airliners. The Federal Aviation
Reauthorization Act of 1996 required FAA reports or action
in many aviation security areas, including: the possibility
of transferring security responsibilities from airlines to
airports or to the government; the certification of
screening companies; weapons and explosive detection
systems; passenger profiling; employee background checks;
federal funding usage; and baggage matching.
2. The Gore Commission
The President established a Commission on Aviation
Safety and Security (the Gore Commission) in August 1996.
Its aim was to:
study matters involving aviation safety and
security, including air traffic control and to
develop a strategy to improve aviation safety and
security, both domestically and internationally
(Gore Commission, 1997). 
The Gore Commission focused on how the government
could behave more like the private sector, while bringing
down government spending.  Three mandates were assigned:
(1) identify changing security threats; (2) identify
aviation industry changes; and (3) take advantage of
technological changes in air traffic control.  
The President wanted security examined in light of the
crash of TWA Flight 800. The key security recommendations
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were that the federal government must: (1) lead the fight
against civil aviation threats; (2) commit greater
resources to improving aviation security; and (3) work more
cooperatively with the private sector and local authorities
in carrying out security responsibilities.
However, the Commission expressed its frustration with
these findings:
Sadly we remain, as noted eight years ago, by our
predecessor commission, President Bush's
Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism
which concluded that, "The U.S. civil aviation
security system is seriously flawed and has
failed to provide the proper level of protection
for the traveling public. This system needs major
reform. Rhetoric is no substitute for strong,
effective action" (Gore Commission, 1997).
3. Government Accounting Office Reports
a. Breeches at Federal Agencies and Airports
In the “Breeches at Federal Agencies and
Airports” report (Dillingham 2000a), Congress asked the
Government Accounting Office (GAO) to investigate potential
breeches, by criminals or others, to 19 federal facilities
and two commercial airports.  Its purpose was to determine
whether badges and credentials available for purchase on
the Internet or other public sources would allow terrorists
to enter secure facilities and gain access to protected
public buildings and airports.
GAO agents made 21 attempts to gain access with
false IDs and were successful on all 21 attempts—18 times
on the first attempt and three times on the second.  In the
two incidents at commercial airports, agents used tickets
issued in undercover names and identified themselves as
armed law enforcement officers.  They were freely waved
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around checkpoints without further screening. The results
of this report were well publicized in the media.  
b. Long-Standing Problems Impair Airport
Screeners' Performance 
The report “Long-Standing Problems Impair Airport
Screeners' Performance”, addressed Congress’s concern about
the effectiveness of screening checkpoints and of the
efforts to improve them, they asked GAO to examine: the
causes of screeners’ problems in detecting dangerous
objects and the efforts of the FAA to address these
problems; and the screening practices of selected foreign
countries and the potential for using these practices to
help improve screeners’ performance in the United States. 
The report (Dillingham, 2002b) determined that
screener effectiveness has been a long-standing problem due
to rapid turnover and human factors such as repetitive
tasks, job-related stress, screeners' aptitude for the
work, and lack of threat object training 1.  One reason for
rapid turnover was the low wage compensation at or near
minimum wage2. In numerous cases, the local airport fast
food restaurant paid a higher wage than the screeners
received.  
The FAA had been pursuing several initiatives to
remedy these ongoing problems, but the GAO concluded that
most of these efforts are behind schedule.  For example,
the FAA is two years behind schedule in issuing a
regulation requiring the certification of screening
companies as mandated by the Federal Aviation
                    
1 Training for screeners to determine whether an image on an x-ray
screen or triggering of a metal detector’s alarm indicates a security
concern and the proper actions to take.
2  Dillingham 2000b, page 25.
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Reauthorization Act of 1996.  It had not: (1) completed and
integrated [its] plan to tie its various efforts to improve
screeners’ performance to the achievement of its goals; and
(2) adequately measured its progress in achieving its goals
for improving screeners’ performance.
As part of its recommendations, the GAO observed
screening in five countries: Belgium, Canada, France, the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom.  Significant
differences were noted, such as higher wages3 and better
benefits, and more extensive training and screening
responsibility assumed by the government or airport
authority versus the air carrier (except in Canada). 
GAO was critical of the FAA's lack of an
integrated plan detailing how its efforts to improve
screeners' performance was related to the goals required by
the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993. GAO
recommended that the FAA’s integrated checkpoint screening
management plan be promptly completed, implemented,
continuously monitored and updated, and periodically
evaluated for effectiveness.  
4. FAA Criticism by Aviation Authorities
Aviation experts have said that if the FAA had been
tougher in exercising federal oversight, the TSA might not
have been established.  The FAA's failures to implement the
recommendations in the previously cited reports led to its
own demise in the security enforcement function. 
                    
3 All paid more relative to those countries wages, than the U.S.:
France paid about $5.15, Canada paid $5.34, the Netherlands about $7.50
(considered a middle class income), U.K. about $8, and Belgium paid
about $14 to $15 U.S. dollars per hour. Source: Dillingham 2000b, page
37
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A former federal regulator places the blame for the
events of September 11 in this statement: 
I take it out on the government. In the end, the
airlines do what they are supposed to. Because
they are private business[es], they are supposed
to try and get away with everything they can to
save the bottom line, to make their investors on
Wall Street happy. That is how this game works. 
The flip side is we expect our aviation cops, the
FAA, to keep us safe. That is the weak link. That
is the one thing you can't get around no matter
how you do the scenario. The people, who by law
are supposed to protect us, didn't. (Schiavo,
2002)
An aviation security expert commented that the FAA
seemed to be unwilling to make the tough decisions.  To get
around making decisions, it was easy to study any issue to
death or assign it to a Commission. That, says the expert,
"explains why the FAA failed to do anything about the
professionalism of screeners from September 1996 (the time
of the Gore Commission report) until after September 11,
2001.” (Kauvar 2002)
D. EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act (ATSA) of 2001(ATSA 2001). It created the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), which
succeeded the FAA as the agency with primary responsibility
for civil aviation security.  The TSA falls under the
Department of Transportation and its director, John McGaw,
who holds the position as Under Secretary of Transportation
for Security.  
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1. Highlights of the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act of 2001
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) of
2001 also includes other vital transportation means, such
as rail, maritime (including Port Authorities) and other
surface links. Aviation security will become a direct
federal responsibility.  This marks a significant change in
attitude, making aviation security, as the Gore Commission
recommended, a national security issue instead of an
aviation issue.
There are ten major calendar milestones to meet on or
before December 31, 2002.  The pertinent major mandated
provisions are:
• One hundred percent baggage screening by December
31, 2002.
• Deploying sufficient explosive detection systems
(EDS) so that 100 percent of checked baggage can
be screened for explosives by December 31, 2002. 
• Assumption of the passenger and baggage screening
function from the air carriers, with tough new
employment hiring and firing criteria. 
Significantly improved baggage screeners
training, wage compensation and the generous
benefits of federal employment. 
• Appointment of Federal Security Directors at each
major airport.  Depending on the size of the
airport, they could be responsible for several
airports in the immediate area. They will oversee
federal security operations at the nation's
airports and be responsible for a full range of
airport security, enforcement and oversight.  
• New level of cooperation with other federal
agencies to fight against potential terrorist
threats.  
• Tougher guidelines for airport perimeter
security.
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• Increased funding for research and development to
enhance transportation security.
• 100 percent screening of employees and vehicles—
i.e. same standards as passengers.
• Federal funding to help airports cover costs of
federally mandated improvements, if not already
provided.
• Security Screening Pilot Program.  Under this
program, effective immediately, five airports (of
different categories), can request permission to
keep private security at their airport for a
three-year evaluation period. The TSA must choose
five from all the airports that so request.
• Security Screening Opt Out program.  Effective
November 19, 2004, an airport can opt out of
using federal screeners and return the screening
function to private contractors as long as the
private contractor can provide screening services
and protection equal to or greater than Federal
Government personnel and it is owned and
controlled by a U.S. citizen.  - Computer-
Assisted Passenger Pre-screening: used to
evaluate passengers for threat potential during
check-in.
Regarding the proposed changes, Kauvar (2002) stated:
Many of the Commission’s recommendations are now
part of the Aviation and Transportation Security
Act, not because they would have averted the
September 11th attacks, but because they make
sense in responding to the existing threat to
civil aviation, which the Commission rightly
identified as a national security issue. 
E. TSA’S SCOPE AND CHALLENGES 
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act was
drafted, signed and implemented just over two months after
the terrorist attacks of September 11. Although forceful,
sweeping, and dramatic, the new statutory laws are vague,
with little or no clarification from TSA (Denari 2002).  
  19
TSA is a brand-new stand-up agency with all the
challenges of a new organization—an accelerated ramp up,
hiring, training, technology acquisitions, and deadlines to
meet. There are twelve provisions to be enacted
immediately. (Appendix B).  
There is much evidence to demonstrate that the goals
are too ambitious to implement by the end of 2002 (Davis
2002). TSA has to modify several major provisions to meet
the letter of the Act versus the spirit intended by
Congress. Some examples of this are: TSA’s making the air
carriers match passengers to bags versus physically
inspecting all bags; the continued use of the highly
criticized security vendor Argenbright; and the
implementation of explosive trace devices versus all EDS.  
This section looks at challenges involved in
implementing the major provisions of the ATSA act,
including organizational, funding, and Explosive Detection
System issues, as well as stakeholders' views.
1. Start-Up Agency
Major challenges include hiring, training and
deploying a rapidly expanding force of approximately 60,000
personnel at America’s 453 commercial airports.  Original
estimates were 40,000 in the early days of the bill’s
passing.  That number has increased 50 percent since then
and 333 percent beyond the 18,000 currently used by private
contractors.  
2. Federal Representation at the Local Airport
Heading TSA representation at the airport level is the
newly created position of Federal Security Director (FSD). 
The FSD is responsible for overseeing federal security
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operations, including screening, enforcement and oversight
at these airports.  Some will have more than one airport in
their purview.  So far, 21 of the 81 positions have been
announced. Of the 21, only two have significant aviation
background; eight are from federal law enforcement; seven
are retired military; and three are from local law
enforcement (TSA, 2002). 
3. Funding
The start-up costs to implement the act are rapidly
increasing (Johnson, 2002).  In April 2002, The President
asked Congress for an additional $4.4 billion to continue
operations.  Congress recently rebuked the TSA when it was
unable to justify the supplement with details (Johnson,
2002).  
Key money drivers are screeners, law enforcement
officers, FSMs, and air marshals, as well as the pace and
type of EDS installation (Mead, 2002).  Ken Mead, Inspector
General of the Department of Transportation, stated in
February of 2002 that “the pace of events since 9/11 has
caused substantial fluidity in the budget numbers. . . .
Clearly, a supplemental appropriation will be needed.” Mead
estimates the new employee level for TSA will be between
60,000 to 72,000.  A Congressman noted that a force of
72,000 would be larger than the U.S. Coast Guard (Johnson,

























* Based on 40,000 employees by November 2002 deadline. New
estimate is between 60,000-70,000 employees.

Table 2.   DOT IG Budget Forecast for FY02 and
FY03 (In billions of U.S. Dollars). From Mead,
2002.

4. Explosive Detection System (EDS) Machines  
This equipment represents the frontline technological
defense against terrorist bomb threats. The cost is
approximately $1,000,000 per machine. EDS requirements
range from 1,850 to 2,200 units needed at America’s
airports.  As of April 2002, 178 EDS machines were in
place.  Due to production limitations, the estimated
shortfall is between 700 and 1,400 machines (Mead, 2002).
EDS machines weigh about 2,500 pounds each and take a
large amount of space, regardless of where they are
installed. If they are installed in the airport concourse
area, space for queuing passengers may be lost.  The other
approach is to incorporate them into one large baggage
system for the entire airport (Martin, 2002). These
machines, in total, must be able to process approximately
1.4 billion pieces of luggage each year (Martin, 2002).
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Most airports have more than one airline, each using
different baggage systems.  At this time, they are neither
geared up nor have the infrastructure to incorporate a
single luggage system. San Francisco International Airport
is one of the few to incorporate a European style system,
having installed theirs in 1998.  To do so requires
millions of dollars and months of work (Denari, 2002). Each
machine accounts for approximately 20 percent of the total
cost of EDS when installation and infrastructure support
are factored into the total investment (Davis 2002).  
Trace Detection equipment is now going to supplement
EDS until enough EDS machines are available.  This
equipment is readily available, but, although lower-cost,
is less capable than EDS. Once the EDS machines arrive at
their assigned airports, they may still sit in storage for
long periods due to the expensive and time-consuming
infrastructure changes (Davis, 2002).  
Secretary of the Department of Transportation Norman
Manetta twice has admitted that the 100-percent EDS mandate
is unreachable (Davis, 2000).  
5. Management of Personnel, Goals and Objectives
To upgrade professionalism for baggage screeners, new
criteria for hiring, training, testing and compensating
were implemented. Conditions of continued employment are
based on attaining satisfactory annual performance reviews.4 
The TSA Secretary “may employ, appoint, discipline,
terminate, and fix the compensation, terms, and conditions
of employment of Federal service for such a number of
                    
4 Section 111, (5) Annual Proficiency Review.
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individuals as the Under Secretary determines to be
necessary to carry out the screening functions…”5
Long standing concerns about the ability of
supervisors to terminate well-protected federal employees
was voiced but no additional powers of termination were
specifically noted.  The researcher closely studied the
wording of the ATSA and determined no additional
termination powers were included beyond what the FAA had
previously. One airport advocate, who was interviewed for
this research, noted this issue was not specifically
addressed in the ATSA.  He said, “It’s subtle. Note that
the personnel do not get included in federal retirement and
the [TSA] Secretary is given discretion over personnel
rules, etc.”  However, the TSA Secretary does have the
right to review, and revise as necessary, any standard,
rule, or regulation governing the employment of individuals
as security screening personnel.6 Whether it will be hard or
easy to terminate employees, therefore, will depend on
regulations yet to be written.
The ASTA delineates a “results-based”7 management
philosophy using measurable goals and milestones to
determine levels of performance, and providing annual
progress reports to Congress, as mandated, for all
government agencies, by the Government Performance and
Results Act (GPRA) of 1993.8

                    
5 Section 111, (d) Screener Personnel.
6 Section 111, (3) Examination; Review of Existing Rules. 
7 Section 130, Results Based Management.
8 Section 130, Results Based Management.
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6. Stakeholder Comments
Airport Security Directors say that TSA is not seeking
their advice and knowledge of airport security operations.
They see the TSA as having a “Secret Service” mentality,
resulting in frustration and communications breakdown
(Johnson, 2002; Power, 2002).  Denari [2002] says TSA
provides little or no clarification regarding guidance and
fails to recognize the expertise of all stakeholders. 
F. AIRPORTS' CHALLENGES
America has the largest aviation system in the world
terms of flights, passengers and baggage handled (Martin,
2002). As our commercial aviation system evolved, no two
airports were designed alike. All are run by a state,
county, municipality or port authority. Each airport’s
circumstances are different and unique, and their
challenges are many. In addition to implementing EDS and
securing funding to support ongoing operations and federal
mandated security changes, they must, at the same time,
establish a good working relationship with the TSA and
continue to provide the best customer service possible with
minimal disruption.
1. Implementing EDS into Airport Baggage Systems
While all airports are different in terms of design
and location, there are some similarities in baggage
systems designs that present challenges to implementing EDS
in accordance with the mandate. Dr. Gerry Kauvar (2002),
Former Staff Director for the White House Commission on
Aviation and Safety, points out: 
What large airports have in common is cramped,
noisy areas into which complex conveyer belt
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systems are incorporated, often hung from the
ceiling which limits the amount of load that can
be placed on them-[as well as]exposure to the
weather, the need to accommodate a wide variety
of baggage handling ground equipment and lots of
people.  The workload is uneven, and baggage-
tagging systems are not standard. Many airports
have different luggage systems where each airline
has their own baggage check at the same airport. 
You could have several different systems.  
2. Funding Issues
The funding for airports has been challenging. In
general, airports are non-profit organizations run by a
local government or port authority.  Any profits realized
are used to provide funds for continued maintenance or
improvements to the airport itself.  The only exception is
taxes received from concession sales, which can go to the
local government.  
A few airports generate profits for their
municipalities, such as San Francisco, Seattle, New York
and a few others. This is due to some grandfathered laws
that are no longer on the books. In these cases, the city
relies on the revenue generated by the airport and,
therefore, a loss of profits affect not only the airports’
finances, but also the cities’.
Table 3 illustrates the various sources from which




























Table 3.   Typical Airport Funding.  From   FAA
Form 5100-125, CY  1999.

The terrorist attacks have forced airports to look for
other options for funding.  Many had to make hurried
decisions to quickly meet new federal requirements
involving restructured parking facilities to incorporate
barriers, which results in fewer parking spaces,
inconvenience, and revenue loss. The ATSA allows for use of
some federally funded monies normally provided (such as the
federally supplemented Airport Improvements Program or AIP)
to be diverted to security-related improvements. At the
Second Annual Aviation Security Summit in San Francisco in
March 2002, a sampling of three Airport Security Operators
told the researcher that they condemn this practice since
the funds are needed to make ongoing improvements to
airport taxiways and infrastructure.  If improvements are
not made or are postponed, there are no immediate plans to
recoup those funds.  
Locally issued Airport Bonds are a common way to raise
capital investment funds. However, uncertainty about the
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amount of funding needed, the ability of the federal
government to reimburse the funds spent, security changes
from TSA, and airport revenue losses cause deep
reservations about issuing bonds. At the Security Summit,
three airport operators informally interviewed by the
researcher stated that fear of changes by the TSA has held
them back from making security improvements on their own.
They explained that airport users would be forced fund the
improvements in the form of higher prices.
3. Working with the TSA
The civil aviation community and its security
professionals are striving to cope with the rapid pace of
change, implement daunting mandates and deadlines, work
with an evolving new federal agency, and deal with serious
funding constraints.  They are dealing with all of this in
light of the ongoing battle against future terrorist
threats.  Airport Security Directors told a Congressional
panel that they are displeased with TSA’s approach and that
they believe their advice and concerns are not welcome
(Johnson, 2002).
The airline industry has approximately 600,000 direct
employees.  The TSA is bringing in between 60,000 and
70,000 additional employees (depending on the source). 
That represents ten percent of the entire industry.
A potential conflict of interest could arise.  Whereas
the FAA was the overseer and regulator of the industry, TSA
is now involved in daily operation as well as regulatory
function. This could change its willingness to report real
problems.  Previously, reporting on aviation issues was
very open, and the results were widely available and
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disseminated. One anonymous airline industry representative
said to the researcher, “I say this clinically, not
cynically, you’re not going to hear about security
failures.” 
G. THE EUROPEAN MODEL
In the aftermath of September 11, many press and
public figures pointed to the success of Europe’s airport
structure and felt that this model had much to offer.  
Since Europe comprises so many countries, there would
be too many structures to look at here.  Thus, the model
chosen for discussion is that of the United Kingdom, which
has been acknowledged as one of the best and most
successful of the European models.  This section explains
how, in the U.K., airport ownership, law enforcement, and
baggage screening are arranged.  
1. What is the European Model? 
Many Western European countries dealt with terrorist
threats by federalizing their airports. As recently as
twenty years ago, many were still run that way.  Since
then, a different approach has been used: privatization. 
Many of these countries created self-supporting airport
corporations for most major airports (Poole, 2001).  While
some continue to be government-owned privatized companies,
many have completely privatized. Table 4 shows a sample of




















Table 4.   European Privatized Airports. From
Poole (2001)

These cities found that by privatizing, the benefits
of cost controls and management from “for profit”
corporations made them both effective and efficient. The
government was able to retain the regulatory agency and lay
out tough standards and impose tough sanctions if those
standards were not met. It was up to the individual airport
to determine how to meet the standards.
The United Kingdom was the first country to privatize. 
The airport authority, the British Airports Authority
(BAA), was created in 1965 as a privatized government
agency, incorporating in 1987.  The BAA is a publicly held
company traded on the London Stock Exchange.  Recognizing
the BAA's success, many other governments followed suit. 
BAA is private, it is motivated by profit to find the best
ways to hire, train, implement technology, control cost,
meet regulations and provide high levels of customer
service. 
Interesting to note is the fact that many of the same
companies hired in various European airports are also used
in the United States.  The major difference is that, in
  30
Europe, they deal directly with the airport or government
instead of the air carrier (Poole, 2002).  
2. Law Enforcement
Suomi (2002) says that BAA takes a different approach: 
They look at airport security as a critical
element of the total airport management.  They
take a little bit different approach to it. . . .  
[T]hey look at it as more of a system. 
Therefore, the private sector employees that are
manning the screening checkpoint are higher
caliber, higher paid airport security on more of
a career path.
The U.K.'s airports’ armed police are provided by
local government.  They are based at the airport and
respond by alarm from the security checkpoints, although
they do not run them.  The airport must pay the local
authorities for providing the police (Suomi, 2002).
3. Baggage Screening Operations
Many airport operators view BAA’s baggage screening
system as the most desirable model (Martin, 2002).  Its
creation was a direct reaction to the terrorist bombing of
Pam Am Flight 103, in December of 1988, which exploded over
Lockerbie, Scotland, killing 259 passengers and 11
bystanders.  A luggage bomb, which was intentionally
checked aboard a flight in Germany by a Libyan terrorist,
changed planes twice before ending up on the Pan Am flight. 
There was no doubt the target was America via an American
air carrier.  
In the U.K., this terrorist act caused a revolution in
baggage handling (Martin, 2002).  The response was to build
a system preventing baggage from traveling unmatched to a
passenger and unscreened for explosives.  It took an
investment of 14 years and $300 million dollars to
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implement this system at London’s Heathrow International
airport, the fourth busiest airport (passenger movement) in
the world (ACI, 2002). BAA administers the system.
The system consists of tiers with all bags passing
through the lowest tier.  If a bag does not clear a lower
tier, it is shunted into the next level for further
scrutiny.  Heathrow’s is a five-tier system, which uses X-
ray machines, threat analysis software, human screeners,
and sophisticated scanning machines (Computed Tomography
(CT) and Standard Projection (SP)).  The system minimizes
human interaction and maximizes machine processing.  Humans
intervene on an as-needed basis only.  All bags are
inspected, including those that are only changing planes. 
The relative absence of human intervention minimizes
customer inconvenience and delayed flights and baggage. 
Appendix C contains a diagram of the system.
Although the European baggage handling system has been
highly successful, Poole (2001) says:
Ironically, the three biggest security firms in
Europe—Securitas, Securicor, and ICTS—are the
parent companies of the U.S. firms that provide
60 percent of all passenger screening here. Yet
while turnover of European passenger screeners is
less than 50 percent per year, it’s often between
100-200 percent in this country. Why? Because you
get what you pay for.
4. Flaws of the European System
It should be noted that, although the European system
has many exemplary features, it does have some flaws. 
Several of the subjects interviewed for this thesis
expressed concerns that are discussed in this section.
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An airport security analyst noted that the reject rate
on the scanner-type machines such as the CT and SP is high. 
A different standard is needed to keep the reject rate at
an acceptable failure rate or else it will cause throughput
problems. The analyst noted that their luggage reject rate
is much lower than the U.S. standard. No one has solved the
problem yet, and the concern is that they will miss
something. The key is the front end (profiling).
An industry analyst stated that European air carrier
operations, generally speaking, aren’t as extensive as the
United States’ (in terms of numbers of annual flights and
airports). While they might have good techniques and
systems to learn from, there’s no system where you could do
exactly that.”
One airport security operator noted a potential
problem with using EDS only in later stages of screening. 
He said, “They [Europeans] are counting on the x-ray
machine for most of the screening.  The difference between
an x-ray machine and an explosive detection machine is
fairly significant.”  
In fact, the recent advances in plastic explosives in
Europe and the former Soviet block countries could test the
capability of the front line x-ray machines. A two-
dimensional back scanner x-ray machine coupled with CT
technology is necessary to discern an explosive materials
profile. For that reason, the government did not approve x-
ray technology as a system for finding explosives. It will
identify only five of the six explosive categories
currently tested in the FAA technology centers.  
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H. THE ISRAELI MODEL
After September 11, many press and public figures
pointed to the success of Israel’s airport structure and
felt that this model had much to offer.  Israel's airports
have been acknowledged as among the safest and most
successful in the world. Israel's is viewed as the most
invasive of all aviation security systems models.
1. Ownership
Israel has one international, state-owned airline, El
Al, which operates out Israel’s only international
terminal, Ben Gurion Airport. Israel adopted the European
style of public-private airport ownership about five years
ago (Poole, 2001).  The government regulatory agency,
Shabak, acts as the regulator for the Ben Gurion Airport
Authority, which must meet the government's standards.  
2. Security
Israel's success lies in its invasive, interrogational
approach.  The goal is to identify terrorists before they
embark on one of its planes. Sky marshals are present on
all flights, and a team of agents interrogates passengers
upon check-in.  They don’t ask yes or no questions. Rather,
they typically ask where the passenger is going, why, whom
they know at the destination, and why they may have used
cash to pay for their ticket. Nothing is taken for granted. 
With approximately 30 aircraft providing service,
Israeli officials have the time to implement such a
rigorous system and maintain their schedule easily.  They
hire private contractors to provide profiling software
(ICTS) to the government and pre-boarding screening
(Amishav)(Poole, 2001).
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3. Flaws of The Israeli Model
While most Israeli airport officials agree that this
model works for them, they don’t have the operational tempo
of passengers, baggage, flights, or cargo volume of the
American air carriers.  Israel has 35 airplanes and one
airport, whereas the United States operates 453 airports
and 6,000 planes. The daily throughput of passengers and
baggage in the United States will not permit such time
intensive procedures. Customers will simply look for


























This study provides insights from civil aviation
security systems experts on pre- and post-9/11 airport
security.  These officials were asked in person or in phone
interviews for their views on 21 aviation security issues.  
This chapter summarizes their responses.  Many of the
experts’ answers were similar in theme; those that best
expressed their sentiment or had something unique to
express are presented.  
While the experts interviewed do not speak for the
entire industry, they nevertheless provide insights into
current issues that are changing their industry and may be
representative of the views of their professional
contemporaries. All respondents were assured that their
responses would remain anonymous.
B. THE INTERVIEW RESPONSES
1. What Was America’s Posture Pre-9/11?
The majority of respondents believed America placed a
high priority on airport security.  Reasons for this belief
include a previously successful record of security
incidents, emphasis on minimum customer inconvenience, and
stressing airline safety over security. However, there was
a range of opinions:
Aviation Security Consultant: 
America has always placed a pretty high priority
on airport security… One answer might be there
was sufficient priority against the known
threats… It was an issue of whether or not
airport aviation security was seen as a national
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security issue.  It wasn’t; it was seen as an
aviation security issue. 
Airport Security Operator: 
Given the level of threat during that period of
time prior to September 11th, it was a tough sell. 
The flying public didn’t like being
inconvenienced by then existing security
measures.
Air Carrier Advocate:
Prior to September 11th, there was a lot of
emphasis on aviation security.  The industry and
the FAA, the intelligence community had fairly
good security programming. We weren’t prepared as
a country to deal with suicide terrorists in
civil aviation.
2. Are the Airport Authorities that Currently
Perform Non-Baggage Screening Operations (Like
Those Run by City/County Authorities) in a Better
Position to Assume Security Responsibilities than
the Federal Government?  If so, Could They? 
Should They?
Opinion was divided evenly on whether airports are in
a better position to assume security responsibilities. 
Most felt that, without immediate government action, no
significant change in quality of personnel or compensation
would have occurred. Without immediate improvements in
funding, personnel, and compensation for screeners,
airports would not have been better off than they were
before the federal government assumed security
responsibilities.
Aviation Security Consultant:
Well, they [airports] don’t want the
responsibility; they don’t want an unfunded
mandate.  If you give them the money to do it and
hold them accountable, I think they would be
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happy to do it.  But what they did not want was
to be put into a position and say ’you’re going
to do it, you‘re going to pay for it and here‘s
how you‘re going to do it.’  I don’t blame them.
Airport Advocate:
Many of our airports think they would be more
responsive because the airport is in a better
position to know its service patterns, its
facilities, its general make-up than the federal
government. They would be prepared to do it if
they were provided liability protection, which is
a major problem right now in the insurance
industry and [if] they were provided some form of
resources or if they were able to put the cost
into their fee base with the airlines.
Air Carrier Advocate:
We had never been in support of the aviation
community [air carriers or airports] taking over
the screening function or security. The
difficulty with that is you can’t have a local
option, local approach when you’re trying to run
an integrated aviation system from an operational
standpoint.
Airport Security Operator:
I, quite frankly, think it is better handled by
the government rather than by individual local
communities.  I think the only way to get
standardization in the security field is to have
one entity responsible for it.
3. Were Many of the Federalized Employees Formerly
with Private Contractors?  If Yes, What
Difference Will Federalizing Make?
Most agreed that it was too early to tell since
federalized screeners have assumed operation in just one
airport thus far (Baltimore-Washington International). They
did agree that federalizing was the most expedient way to
allow for better-qualified personnel with higher pay
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benefits and a career path.  It is too soon to tell if
better-quality screening will be achieved. 
Federal Aviation Regulator:
. . . the hope is they are going to get the best
of the screeners who were already there.
Aviation Security Consultant:
. . . You attract probably more highly qualified
people.  It’s always been one of the lowest-
paying jobs at the airport.
Airport Advocate: 
Federalization has taken care of two of the major
points and that’s training, which the federal
government will be accountable for, and turnover. 
Could you have done that with a different model? 
Yes, but nobody did.  So, when the failure came,
people saw federalization as the answer.
Airport Security Operator: 
I was in favor of federalization because I knew
if the government took it over we’d be able to
raise the bar in terms of compensation.  I
thought compensation might lead to high-caliber
individuals.
Airport Security Operator:
I, quite frankly, think it is better handled by
the government rather than by individual local
communities. . . . I think [what is important] is
no matter who they hire . . . there will be one
training standard, one quality assurance standard
that those employees will to be held to.
4. Do You Think Airport Security Should Be
Federalized At All?
The respondents were evenly divided.  Those who
favored federalizing, with the exception of one, felt it
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helped set standards or was the right thing to do in lieu
of a better method. 
Aviation Security Consultant:
No.  First of all, it’s a fragmented
responsibility.  Airport security is not
federalized, only part of it is federalized. No,
I don’t think it was a good idea.
Federal Aviation Regulator: 
My biggest concern about federalizing the
screening function is [that] the same agency is
overseeing themselves in terms of oversight and
performance of their operation.
Air Carrier Advocate: 
We felt that the screening process needs to be
federalized . . . as part of an overall federal
approach to national security.  We didn’t support
keeping security privatized.
5. What Do You Think About Keeping Security
Privatized with Federal Oversight?
There was no clear consensus, with half agreeing that
airport security should be privatized.  The other responses
ranged from strong support for keeping it federalized to no
strong opinion as long as better-quality work is produced.
Federal Aviation Regulator:
So, a strong federal oversight is really
important.  That is why I don’t think the airport
should be doing it because I think we need
something unified.
Aviation Security Consultant:
I think the job of the federal government is to
set the standards, to ensure the standards are
met and to keep the standards up to date.  Had
the FAA been tougher, I think it would have
worked just as well as if the federal government
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had taken over.  
Airport Advocate: 
I traditionally think operations are better done
by the private sector with tough federal
accountability.
Air Carrier Advocate:
I think it could have worked either way if they
had the appropriate enforcement and oversight
mechanism in place.
6. Aside from Baggage Screeners, What Other
Positions Are Likely to be Federalized?  
Most agreed that there would not be much more
expansion outside of passenger and baggage screening
functions, but many felt uncertainty about future changes. 
The Aviation and Transportation and Security Act calls for
assumption of law enforcement, in support of the screening
functions, but has been stalled due to agency funding and
resource constraints.  
Federal Aviation Regulator:
I don’t think that has been figured out yet.  I
have not heard anything about TSA assuming access
point [secured entrances for vendor and airport
staff] screening.  Things are changing every day. 
Aviation Security Consultant:
. . . I don’t know what the political pressures
are going to be from the airlines and the airport
authority to retain some portion of airport
security.  So, it’s a real question about the
role of federal government. But I think the jury
is still out.
Airport Advocate:
There’s been some talk about whether you might
have perimeter security and other law enforcement
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officers federalized.  But, your question is
whether they would likely be and the answer is no
simply because of resource constraints.
7. If Federalized, Employment Competition is
Essentially Eliminated.  Do You Think Complacency
Could Become an Issue?
Most felt that complacency is definitely a concern for
two reasons.  First is the fear of a slow-moving government
agency, such as the INS or the Post Office, which is why
most felt that the TSA included a provision for
competition, allowing private screening companies in the
future. Second, the screening function itself is monotonous
and naturally leads to boredom and complacency.
Federal Aviation Regulator:
Federal agencies are slow-moving, and they don’t
have competitors.  Yes, it could become an issue.
There was a real concern for competition and this
[provision to allow private contractors in a few
years] is a compromise to leave the door open for
it.
Aviation Security Consultant:
Complacency could always be an issue.  I don’t
think it matters whether you work for the
government or a contractor. If they go back to
private security with federal oversight and the
contractors are doing a better job, then I think
you’ll see more and more airports trying to do
that.
Airport Advocate: 
Complacency can emerge, even if there is
employment competition, because a lot of the jobs
they’re talking about are very routine. Yes, you
have reduced some employment competition. And
yes, potentially, complacency could become an
issue.
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8. Considering the Difficulty of Terminating an
Employee Now, Do You Think It Will Be Harder or
Easier to Make Employee Changes if They Are
Federalized?
All respondents acknowledged the traditional
difficulty of terminating a federal employee and recognized
that the TSA made strong provisions to overcome these
difficulties.  Most agreed that Congress addressed this
issue with wording that was strong enough to make
termination no more difficult than in the private sector. 
Aviation Security Consultant:
I think Congress was aware [that], traditionally,
[in] civil service [it] is a very long process to
get rid of a bad employee.
Federal Aviation Regulator:
It will definitely be harder to get rid of an
employee.  How difficult will depend on the new
way they were allowed to organize as a results-
based organization.  So, it will depend on how
the contract is laid out.
Airport Advocate:
They are still federalized; that will make them
harder to get rid of.
9. What Do You Like about the European and Israeli
Airport Security Models?
a. European model
The range of respondents’ knowledge of Europe’s
approach ranged from little to very knowledgeable.  Most
recognized that there is not really one style to claim as
the “European model.” They vary from country to country.
Most like the fact that European screeners receive more pay
than American screeners. They believe that the European
system attracts better-quality employees, offers more
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flexibility in decision-making, and uses a better approach
to luggage screening.  Many thought that we could adopt the
good aspects of the European system, but that we should not
completely mimic their approach. 
Aviation Security Consultant:
They have more flexibility to change and modify
things.  Ours is going to be cookie cutter.
Airport Security Operator:
. . . Maybe more than the screening processes of
passengers, we have to look at the screening
processes for checked baggage; they have been
quite a ways ahead of us.
Aviation Security Consultant:
If you look at European operations generally,
they just aren’t as extensive as us.  So, while
they might have gotten good techniques and
systems that you could learn from, there’s
nothing that you could say “ok, let’s do exactly
that.”  I don’t think there is a European model. 
I think there is a country-by-country model and
almost an airport-by-airport model.
b. Israeli Model
This model drew the strongest opinions.  Even
those who knew little of Europe seemed to have strong
opinions of this model.  Most admired Israel's success and
ability to screen one hundred percent of passenger baggage. 
It works well for them.  Several admired the way their
screening process begins before the passengers arrive at
the airport, as well as their profiling program. These are





. . . the hard, tough profiling they do of
passengers is certainly something we ought to
give some stronger consideration to.
Aviation Security Consultant:
. . . it takes nothing for granted.  Our
protocols in the past have relied on yes/no
answers to questions. . . . The Israelis never
ask a question that could be answered yes or no.
10. What Do You Dislike about the European and
Israeli Models?
a. European
There were no negative opinions. 
b. Israeli 
It was too intrusive of privacy, and Americans
probably would not like an interrogation-like screening
process. Additionally, it would greatly increase passenger-
and baggage-processing time.
Air Carrier Advocate:
Look at the size and scope of what goes on in
Israel compared to us; David Ben Gurion airport,
in any 24-hour period, has about 46 international
departures.  When I was at one of the airlines,
we flew more international operations in one day
than El Al flew in one month.  The passenger[s]
[have] to subject themselves to a two- or three-
hour process. They have no real domestic aviation
system. Primarily, they have international
flights.  It’s just not going to work [in the
U.S.]. 
Airport Security Operator:
We can never survive with the El Al model.  It
wouldn’t work. We would collapse the air
transportation system, in a moment, if we tried
to do that. . . . They [give] everyone a physical
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search, a strip-search. It’s certainly an
incredibly detailed kind of security and almost
low tech.  
Airport Operator Advocate: 
You can’t treat everyone the way the Israelis do. 
We can move to . . . more of an intelligence-
based, data-based model, which is the way we will
ultimately go and the best way. 
11. Airports are Quite Different from One Another in
Terms of Size, Design and Ownership.  Do You
Think the Government Should Provide Performance
Standards and Let the Local Airport Authority
Determine the Best Approach as to How to Achieve
Those Standards?
The majority of respondents strongly favored this
approach. Several were adamant about ensuring that strong
performance standards were in place as a minimum.  Those
who felt that the federal government should determine the
best approach had strong opinions.
Federal Aviation Regulator:
No, I don’t.  I think that would be too close to
what they had before with just the airlines
[handling screening].  Airports would have other
pressures besides securities. They are a business
that needs to make money. They have a lot of
competing pressures. I don’t think they should be
determining the best approach.
Aviation Security Consultant:
. . . [S]et federal standards and let the local
people say how to apply them. What the Gore
commission recommended was a mandatory
vulnerability assessment. I mean, you want a
federal standard in baggage screening.  A local
security plan ought to be based on a
vulnerability assessment and then attempt to seal
off those places. 
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Airport Security Operator:
You can certainly, as an airport, go above that
and establish other kinds of local procedures,
for let’s say, access control, or the deployment
of special systems for something like that to
enhance your program.  But, the fundamental stuff
[minimum federal standards] cannot be tampered
with.
Airport Security Operator: 
. . . [I]in terms of perimeter and access
control, I would say yes.  In terms of screening
passengers, baggage and cargo, no.  That’s
because of the liability issue. 
12. Would you Like to See Some Flexibility to Allow
Airports to Experiment with Different
Technologies, Techniques or Tactics to Develop
Best Security Practices?
Most respondents would like to see airports allowed
some flexibility, in addition to federal standards, in
developing and testing better security practices.
Federal Aviation Regulator: 
I think that’s a good idea. I would like to see
that kind of flexibility.  Right now, it is all
being controlled by TSA. They are trying to
implement new technology at a few airports like
Baltimore-Washington.  I think other individual
airports looking at new technologies would be a
good idea.
Aviation Security Consultant:
Absolutely. I would like airports to experiment,
so long as the minimum standards are being met.
Airport Advocate: 
Yes, I think the federal government can add to
it.  Airports are going to do this anyway because
they’re under the employ of local governments.
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Aviation Security Consultant:
Set the standard and let the local guy do what he
needs to do.  The more flexibility the better as
long as they meet the standard.  This isn’t going
to happen anytime soon.
13. Should There be Established Standards for
Passenger and Baggage Inspections, or Should
There be Randomness at the Local Airport Level?
There was a wide range of answers. The only consensus
was that the majority wished to see some established
standards and some form of additional local randomness. 
Federal Aviation Regulator:
Yes, there should be both.  I think established
standards brings you up to a uniform level. . . .
[T]he randomness is the only hope of catching the
unexpected, very rare event.  If you stay only
with procedures and keep within standards, then
one only has to learn what those procedures are
and get around them. So, I think it’s imperative
to have that randomness as well as [a] high level
of standards.
Airport Security Operator:
Well, I think what we need is profiling and
screening of passengers.  If we know somebody is
a good guy, we ought not waste our time on the
good guy.  They need to be focusing on where the
bad guys are.
Airport Security Operator:
I think we must have randomness in the system. 
If not, the terrorists will learn the process and
develop means to compromise the system. The
greatest fear everyone has is that we will have a
9-11 situation that says the airports or the FAA
did something wrong.  However, it is my opinion
that we did not do anything wrong.  It's that the
terrorists knew what the procedures were and how
to avoid or compromise those procedures.
  49
Airport Advocate:
I think I would not want it to be random, but I
would want differences at the local level and
that depended on what the perceived risk is.  The
international gateways are going to be riskier;
Miami, San Francisco, Chicago, Los Angeles, San
Francisco, New York are places where large
amounts of international traffic come in, so you
might want to take a different approach there. 
But, you wouldn’t want that to be random; you
would just want differences.
14. What are the Biggest Challenges of Implementing
the TSA’s New Guidelines under the Aviation and
Transport Security Act? 
There was a wide range of strong opinions.  The
respondents identified three major challenges: the
Congressional mandates of the TSA act create a harried
environment for its constituency, trying to create a brand
new federal agency; there is a lack of adequate funding;
and the Congressional mandate for 100-percent
implementation of Explosive Detection Systems (EDS)
machines at every U.S. airport will be difficult to
achieve.  Secondary challenges were the requirement for
100-percent screening for passengers and employees and a
lack of comprehensive public policy.  
Federal Aviation Regulator:
I’d say the first challenge is they have to
create a federal agency from scratch.  They’re
saying they are going to hire 60,000 people. 
They have to create the framework, the
bureaucracy; they have to hire the people, and
all under extremely tight deadlines.  It’s an
unheard of task.
Airport Security Operator: 
The challenge is how are we going to meet the
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statutory law created by Congress. The second
thing is we’re never going to, in the near term,
be able to screen airport employees and vehicles
to the same degree as passengers and their
property. . . . [T]hey are going to have a
tremendous climb to find all the employees they
need.  They are going to have a struggle finding
70,000 employees. 
Air Carrier Advocate:
The biggest challenge is coming up with a
comprehensive public policy about where we are
going.  Not just dealing with the acts itself and
the deadlines, but a public policy that
identifies: What we are trying to do. What is the
threat? How are we dealing with the threat? What
do we believe is the best approach for trying to
deal with that threat? Let’s get the best
available technology.  Let’s go back to the
drawing board and look at everything again before
we go forward.  
Aviation Security Consultant:
The biggest challenge is that the law’s
requirement for purchasing and deploying EDS
machines is impossible.  The second challenge is
this business of providing 100-percent screening
for workers and 100-percent screening for
passengers.  Security people say you can’t do
that without bringing the system to its knees. 
You’ve got to trust some.  Even if it could be
implemented, it’s a bad law.  They wrote stuff
into the law that can’t be done.
15. Does TSA Incorporate the Stakeholders’ Views and
Concerns?
All strongly stated that TSA is not incorporating the
viewpoints of the entities that have the most at stake:
airport operators and air carriers.  A few mentioned that
some TSA representatives recently made overtures to
incorporating airport operators' and air carriers' views
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into decision making and policy, but those respondents
assured the researcher that this was not the norm.
Airport Security Operator: 
At this point, it has been a holistic, top-down
approach with a law enforcement bent, who know
little or nothing.  As someone said to me, "they
(TSA) don’t know what they don’t know" about the
aviation business, both the airlines and the
airports. And they are learning the hard way. 
They are getting knocked in the side of the head
by Congress and the airports for their failures
in terms of communications, about understanding
the way business has to be done at the local
level, and our concern for customer service.
Airport Security Operator:
I think there is a combination of ‘top down’ and
soliciting comments.
Airport Security Operator: 
We don’t think the TSA probably embraced the
airport operator’s perspective and really
listened to some of the things going on with us. 
I think they are too busy trying to get it done.
Airport Security Operator: 
There’s a top-down approach by and large, but
it’s getting better. . . . Thus far, I have not
seen any development that makes me think it will
be anything but top-down.  But, I think top-down
would be a mistake, because it would also be a
“one size fits all approach” instead of a
performance-based or airport approach.
Federal Aviation Regulator:
From what I have been hearing from airport
operators . . . it is a top-down approach
definitely, but it’s an outsider approach.  The
teams that are being put together [are] corporate
teams, with a corporate mentality.  But, they are
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not bringing airport perspective.  They have not
been a voice in the process.  Decisions and
structural changes are being made and they feel
they are not part of the process.
16. Are Areas of Responsibilities Clearly Defined?
This question had the most unanimous response of
all the questions asked. Almost all respondents
stated that responsibilities were not clearly
defined.  Much of the uncertainty was due to some
of the regulations in the Act not being executed
by the TSA.  Much of that is due to lack of
funding or manpower or wording in the Act itself
that may prevent clear responsibilities from
being established.  
Air Carrier Operator
Absolutely not. There are tons of issues.  It is
like TSA is taking over some screening, but they
are not taking over all screening.  For example: 
catering screening . . . It [the TSA Act] clearly
says TSA needs to do the screening.  TSA says
we’re not going to screen catering objects; it’s
based on the financial ability to do it. . . .
So, there are no clearly defined roles and
responsibilities.  They are picking and choosing
what they want to be responsible for and what
they are willing to pay for.
Aviation Security Consultant:
I don’t know about “clearly defined”; the TSA
thinks it’s all theirs, and everybody else had to
follow their orders.  
Airport Advocate: 
It’s getting there. We know passenger and baggage
screening is TSA’s responsibility and obviously
the other two legs on the stool support that. 
Screening of employees, perimeter security,
access to the aeronautical area, intelligence
piece [profiling and Federal interagency
database], these are all functions that still
require some role delineation among these three.
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. . .  My fear is that [funding] is going to
drive the roles rather than roles driving the
money.
Aviation Security Consultant:
They are not clearly defined, and what’s worse is
there is no single overseer.  You’ve got three
entities that are responsible for different parts
of security and nobody is in charge of all three
of them. . . . The [ATSA] law’s a factor; the
start up is a factor, yeah, absolutely.
17. What is the Impact of the TSA’s Security
Requirements on Federal and Local Airport
Funding?
The majority of the respondents agreed that the
additional funding impact on both federal and local
agencies has been enormous.  The airports have drained
their resources and now wait for further federal funding to
carry out future security improvements.  Some felt the need
to tap into other non-security funding, decreasing funds
available for infrastructure improvements. The uncertainty
about federal funding has forced the industry to take a
"wait and see" approach about future security plans.  Many
agreed that the costs would ultimately be passed on to the
public in one form or another. 
Air Carrier Advocate:
We’re up to the point now where . . . 40 percent
of your ticket price is tax [on a $100 domestic
ticket].9  So, what you’re doing [with] that
incremental pricing, in a way, is driving away
the leisure traveler to their cars.

                    
9 Upon further research, the tax is 44 percent on a $100 domestic
ticket, 26 percent on a $200 domestic ticket and 19 percent on a $300




We have been seeking additional grants to improve
airport security.  Also, we have spent a lot of
money since 9/11. This is city money to implement
a lot of the security procedures and
requirements.  It has been a drain on both the
federal and local systems.
Airport Security Operator:
. . . [O]ur coffers are completely empty;
therefore, it falls on the feds.  The issue comes
down to: do you expect airports to go after
Airport Improvement Program money [AIP], which
they use clearly to support airport
infrastructure at the airport, runways and
taxiways and kind of suffocate those projects, or
are you going to make TSA funds available?
Airport Advocate: 
What we hope that is that the federal government
will fund mandates put on the airports and
airlines, but that is not going to happen.  They
are going to partially fund them, which means the
airports will have to absorb the costs.  For the
most part, what will then happen is the airport
will put them in their rate base.  What that
means is, simply, the airport users funded the
activity.
Aviation Security Consultant: 
At this point, it’s a guess. There is no money
now to install the machines. TSA presumably will
have enough money to buy them.  The research I’m
aware of says buying the machine is only 21
percent of the cost of getting it installed and
getting it operational.  Where is it going to





18. How Can TSA Best Assist in Improving Aviation
Security? 
Many strong opinions were stated in response to this
question.  Most respondents said that TSA needs to: listen
to industry experts; develop better communications with its
constituency; spend more money on research and development
vice operations; and develop a threat-based strategy
focused on profiling before the passenger arrives at the
airport.  
Air Carrier Consultant:
Number one, a threat-based approach; number two,
an integrated (profiling) process. The third
point: allow movement through system processing
[to be] less invasive than we currently have in
place.
Airport Security Operator: 
. . . [C]ontinue to evaluate equipment and
provide selection basis on the best types of
equipment that can go into airports.  
Airport Security Operator: 
TSA needs to start listening.  Start listening to
Congress.  Start listening to airports.  Start
listening to the airlines.  And make us active
partners in this process.  They are treating us
like the enemy, unfortunately, and that’s not the
way it should be.  We’re the customer, and they
need to start treating us like a customer.
Airport Advocate: 
Working with the other agencies of the federal
government to put together a coordinated,
cohesive, database on passengers who travel in
the system and with that data, establishing a




By listening to the people who have had the
responsibility. They’ve got to listen to the
airports.  Listen to the pros.
19. Would It Make Sense to do An Intense Random
Search of, Say, One of Ten People, So That
Nothing Gets by This Ten Percent, with the Idea
That It Will Dissuade an Actual Hijacker for Whom
the One in Ten Odds of Getting Caught are Too
High?
Most respondents stated that random searches alone
would not be enough to deter determined threats to the
system.  The odds of getting caught are not high enough; a
decoy or innocent bystander could be used.  Randomness, in
addition to a sound profiling system to help identify
possible threats, was widely supported. 
Aviation Security Consultant:
Not really.  The problem here is sheer numbers. 
In other words, they’d put 100 people in various
airports.  If only 20 get through, they’ve done
their job. You need to find out who the people
are in advance.  The key is isolating the most
likelies and searching them.
Airport Security Operator:
Something may get on the airplane carried by an
innocent person that could cause harm to others,
such as a weapon. . . . So, I’m not for 100-
percent checking of bags, but 100-percent
screening of persons and their carry-on luggage
is necessary.
Aviation Security Consultant:
I would like to see two kinds of profiling
systems. The first is bringing together the
federal database.  In the second group, you would
have a random system. Randomness is critical.
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Air Carrier Advocate:
I think we’re willing to be more invasive than
that.  We think the proper construction of a CAPS
II [profiling] program will permit, basically, a
pretty healthy assessment of individuals. . .
.[T]he CAPS process will help delineate what that
is.
Airport Security Operator
I don’t know about percentages. . . . I think we
need to create two levels of passengers.  Figure
out who the good guys are and issue them an ID,
if they are willing.  Those that are not willing
to get an ID and don’t want to work with the
system, then they should be 100-percent screened. 
Then maybe do a 10-percent sampling of the good
guys. . . .
20. Does it Make Sense to Give an 80-Year-Old White,
Black, or Hispanic Woman the Same Security Check
As You Would a 22-Year-Old Male Arabic-Looking
Person?
The majority of respondents agreed, while it may not
make sense to do the same check for all passengers, that an
80-year-old could be duped or even be part of a hijacking
under certain circumstances.  If you just chose ethnicity
without further justification, that would be
discrimination.  All agreed that profiling is key to
avoiding embarrassing passenger searches.
Air Carrier Advocate: 
. . . [E]verybody can honestly reflect on the
fact that there could be instances where, let’s
say, . . . an 80-year-old was duped.
Airport Security Operator: 
Yes. Keep in mind these guys are pretty creative. 
If you’ve studied hijackings and bombings of
aircraft, especially [in] Europe, you’ll know
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that people get used.  They don’t know they are
being used.
Airport Security Operator:
Yes. . . . if you are familiar with any make-up
artist.  A 20-year-old can be made to look [like]
an 80-year-old with the right make-up and
disguise.
Airport Security Operator:
We should use a way to define who ought to get a
random search and who should just get the
standard package, and figure out how we’re going
to do that, if it’s an enrollment program,
trusted traveler. . . .[B]ut there ought to be a
way for us to look at, maybe not so much
profiling, but an identification program for who
ought to receive a higher level of scrutiny and
who shouldn’t.
Airport Advocate: 
Most of the time no, but sometimes yes. The key
to profiling is not ethnicity. The key to
profiling is to look at travel patterns of
somebody: is that person rooted in that community
and perhaps what their employment history is. 
Those things put together may mean the 22-year-
old Arabic-looking person is less of a risk than
the 80-year-old person.  You only come to that
conclusion by looking at a number of criteria.
Aviation Security Consultant:
Yes, it does. We’ve had elderly people try to
carry out suicide bombings.  They use anybody.
They use children. You can’t tell.  Unless you
have reason to be suspicious of 22-year-old
Arabic-looking people, then you’re just
discriminating against them.
Federal Aviation Regulator:
I’ve gone back and forth, personally, on this
issue.  I guess the answer is yes, because if you
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don’t give the same check to all, then you’re
inducing a known weakness into the system.  I
think that it does make sense. 
21. If You Got to Start with a Clean Sheet of Paper,
What Kind of System Would Best Improve Safety for
Travelers and Employees?
This question was the most open-ended, and it received
the most varied responses. However, several themes emerged. 
The system that would provide best practices for improved
traveler and employee safety included profiling, a trusted
traveler program, and strong baggage detection systems. 
The next group of themes included an integrated screening
process and a trusted employee program.  
Air Carrier Advocate:
. . . [W]e really see this as an integrated,
overall process rather than truncating it piece
by piece and build[ing] them separately, which
includes profiling, trusted traveler and
employee, smart deployment of baggage detection.
Airport Advocate: 
One approach I like since September 11th is
building a system of redundancy.  What we need to
do on the front end [of passenger throughput] is
to add that whole security intelligence piece. 
That would add the most important level of
redundancy to it.  That says you don’t only have
one line of defense—a system based on risk where
you provide a base level of screening and
security for travelers.  If it fails, you still
have some kind of backup, which is a classic
security model.
Aviation Security Consultant:
Start at the local level.  I’d start from the
bottom up.  Here are the federal standards; here
is what we want you to do.  You tell me how to
meet those standards based on vulnerability
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analysis conducted by all the stakeholders at
your airport.  Then show me how it’s going to
meet the federal standards. I would also have a
bi-polar profiling system. There are people we
should be concerned [about]; let’s identify them
and get that information out to the airlines. 
Then, you want the element of randomness and you
want continuous improvement; you don’t want to
say ‘let’s meet this standard.’  You want to
encourage the locals to continually ratchet up
security.
Airport Security Operator: 
I think what needs to happen is that the the
brightest in the airport business and the airline
business, the security business, and the
government business get together and determine
the appropriate level of threat, risk and
cost/benefit analysis.  Then decide what is the
appropriate mix of technology, infrastructure and
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V.  FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
This study examined issues in aviation security
brought to light by the events of September 11, 2001. These
issues were approached both in historical terms and from
the perspective of eight officials with a broad spectrum of
aviation experience. Each interview participant was
qualified to comment on the topic, and, considering the
promise of complete anonymity, their views were presumably
candid. 
The overall conclusions of the study are based on an
analysis of relevant literature, as well as on the themes
that emerged from the personal interviews.
B. FINDINGS
1. Aviation was Not Adequately Prepared for
Terrorist Attacks of the Magnitude of the
September 11 Attacks
A false sense of security prevailed because there had
been no serious threats on American soil.  The warnings
presented in studies such as the Gore Commission Report
were ignored.  The FAA did not have the resolve to
implement recommendations or to tell the truth to its
superiors and the public.
2. Congressional Mandates of the ATSA Have Driven
TSA's Behavior  
When the DOT Secretary told Congress of the
difficulties involved with implementing the ATSA mandates,
they rebuked him and set the tone of TSA’s action. The ATSA
mandates became the end instead of the means to better
security. The 100-percent EDS equipment mandate is typical
of this mentality. Congress rushed mandates and choices of
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TSA senior leadership. Thus, TSA was left with little
choice but to look for shortcuts.
3. The TSA Has a Top-Down Approach, and the Law
Enforcement Background of its Senior Leadership
has Alienated Industry Experts 
The TSA's adversarial approach is ineffective.  Lack
of aviation operational experience is hindering the
development of a solid working relationship among federal
government, local government, air carriers and the public. 
The TSA is creating more problems than it is solving. The
inconveniences imposed and the rising security costs are
forcing customers to consider other means of
transportation, while forcing financial hardships on air
carriers and airports. 
4. Funding is Forcing Difficult Decisions over How
Much Security is Enough  
Congress and the American public are facing important
decisions over who will pay for improvements, causing
frustration among all the key players. 
5. The ATSA is Causing Confusion over
Responsibilities among the Key Players
The lack of funding and manpower, as well as the
wording of the Act, are making airports refrain from taking
action. At the same time, TSA is trying to endure the
difficulties of hiring 60,000 personnel.  
6. The Potential for Complacency and Conflict of
Interest Persists  
The addition of so many federal employees raises
concerns about government sloth and the difficulty of
terminating government employees.  While many actions were
taken with the intent to improve the professionalism of the
baggage screening function, no provisions were made in the
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ATSA act to ease the difficulty of terminating federal
employees when necessary.
7. Randomness is a Crucial Aspect of Effective
Security, in Addition to Strong Minimum Standards
that Apply to All Airports
Randomness will give each airport a uniqueness and a
challenge to any threat potential.  
8. Too Much Emphasis on “Single Point” Solutions,
Such as the EDS Mandate
The EDS mandate and 100-percent baggage-screening
requirement are indicative of focusing on single solutions
versus a multi-layered security approach.  The TSA is
essentially putting all its eggs in one basket.  It won’t
have enough funding or focus on implementing other, lower-
cost, effective measures.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. TSA Must Listen to and Work with its Constituency
Government must use a teamwork, partnership approach
with aviation experts. Government must be the catalyst in
involving regulators and experts to form alliances and
share ideas and knowledge.  The synergy created would
produce innovation and practical applications to complex
situations. Government must demonstrate a greater
understanding of the economic repercussions of its actions
on both the industry and taxpayers.
2. Incorporate a Multi-Layered Security Approach
This will provide comprehensive, long-term solutions
that will involve all the key players in identifying and
thwarting as many possible threats as possible.  A team of
security professionals using multi-level law enforcement
agencies and the latest technology will provide the
stiffest defense.
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3. Use Technology to Identify Threats and
Differentiate Friend from Foe
Profiling is the first step toward identifying
potential threats before check-in. Inter-federal government
agencies must share information and provide it to air
carriers. Significant fears of privacy issues are justified
and must be addressed.  The Trusted Traveler and Trusted
Employee programs are important components in identifying
friend from foe. As one air carrier advocate stated:
“Terrorism thrives on nameless, faceless people.”
4. The Multi-Tiered European Approach to Baggage
Screening could be Implemented Effectively
However, it will require a long-term, systematic
approach.  Implementation should be done in stages,
beginning with our highest-volume international airports.
Although this approach is only one of many steps in the
total solution, it will minimize human interaction,
providing more baggage throughput and less chance for human
error. 
5. Continue to Develop the Privatization of Baggage
Screeners
Continued privatization of the screening process
should be pursued.  With proper personnel, compensation,
and training, private companies in Europe demonstrate that
airport authorities, whether quasi-privatized or
privatized, know how to get the best performance for the
right investment. These are lessons already learned from
our European counterparts. 
6. Areas for Further Research
The following are recommended topics for further
research:
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• Determine the impact the elimination of
competition might have on the performance of the
TSA’s baggage screeners.
• Take a survey to determine what difference
federalizing baggage screeners will make. 
• Study the impact of the urgent mandates
delineated by the ATSA on the industry and
consumer behavior.
• Determine if TSA will incorporate aviation
security experts’ knowledge and experience into
future security planning. 
• Determine the fiscal impact of TSA not
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APPENDIX A.  INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
 
1. Prior to September 11th, what priority did America




2. Are the airport authorities that currently perform
non-baggage screening operations (like those run by
city/county authorities), in a better position to
assume security responsibilities than the federal
government?  If so, could they?  Should they?

3. Are many of the federalized employees formerly with
private contractors?  If yes, what difference will
federalizing make?

4. Do you think airport security should be federalized at
all?
5. What do you think about keeping security privatized
with federal oversight?

6. Aside from baggage screeners, what other positions are
likely to be federalized?  

7. If federalized, employment competition is essentially
eliminated.  Do you think complacency could become an
issue?

8. Considering the difficulty of terminating an employee
now, do you think it will be harder or easier to make




9. What do you like about the European and Israeli
airport security model?   






Local vs. Centralized Approach

11. Airports are quite different from others in terms of
size, design and ownership.  Do you think the
government should provide performance standards and
let the local airport authority determine the best
approach as to how to achieve those standards?

12. Would you like to see some flexibility to allow
airports to experiment with different technologies,
techniques or tactics to develop best security
practices?

13. Should there be established standards for passenger
and baggage inspections or should there be randomness
at the local airport level?
 
Implementing the TSA Guidelines
 
14. What are the biggest challenges of implementing the
TSA’s new guidelines under the Aviation and Transport
Security Act? (100% EDS, providing same screening for
airport workers as customers, etc.)

15. Do you think TSA’s approach incorporates enough of
airport operator’s views and concerns, or is there a
“top down” approach?

16. Are the area of responsibilities between the TSA,
airport authorities and airlines clearly defined?  

17. What is the impact of the TSA’s security requirements
on federal and local airport funding?






19. Would it make sense to do an intense random search of,
say, one of 10 people, so that nothing gets by this
10%, with the idea that it will dissuade an actual




20. Does it make sense to give the same security check of
an 80-year-old white, black, or Hispanic woman as you
would a 22-year old male Arabic-looking person?

21. If you got to start with a clean sheet of paper, what
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